

## Message Text

PAGE 01 VIENNA 10210 112301Z

60

ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 SS-20 H-03

NSC-10 /164 W

----- 101331

R 111849Z DEC 73

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 953

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

S E C R E T VIENNA 10210

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

ANKARA FOR DELIVERY TO NATO DEPT TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: HUNGARIAN PLENARY STATEMENT, 11 DEC

TRANSMITTED HERewith IS DEC 11 PLENARY STATEMENT OF HUNGARIAN  
REP. BEGIN TEXT:

1. I HAVE A FEW REMARKS TO MAKE TODAY. THE FIRST OF THEM CONCERNS  
THE AIM OF OUR TALKS. I CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL TO RETURN TO THIS  
SUBJECT, BECAUSE WE MUST HAVE A CLEAR IDEA OF WHAT WE ARE WORKING  
TOWARDS, AND BECAUSE IT IS HERE THAT OUR BASIC DIVERGENCIES MANI-  
FEST THEMSELVES. I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT IN SPRING WE DECIDED  
SECRET

PAGE 02 VIENNA 10210 112301Z

TO HOLD TALKS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS,  
AS WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPAR-  
ATORY TALKS. AND, AS WE ALL WELL REMEMBER AND KNOW, NO EXCEPT-  
IONS WERE ENVISAGED WITH REGARD TO INDIVIDUAL TYPES OF THESE FORCES

AND ARMAMENTS.

2. IT WOULD SEEM THAT THIS WAS A SIMPLE AND CLEAR PROVISION WHICH SHOULD NOT GIVE RISE TO ANY DOUBTS OR INTERPRETATIONS RESTRICTING OR BROADENING ITS REAL MEANING. WHEN, HOWEVER, WE HEAR THE SPEECHES OR READ THE DOCUMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, WE GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THEY ARE APPLYING THEIR OWN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING TO THIS ABSOLUTELY PRECISE FORMULATION, THEY SPEAK OF THE REDUCTION - MOREOVER OF THE FAR FROM IDENTICAL REDUCTION - OF ONLY SOME TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. ONE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS, AS ON THE BASIS OF THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE ONE CAN DRAW ONLY ONE CONCLUSION, WHICH IS THAT OUR TASK IS TO CONDUCT TALKS ON THE WORKING OUT OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

3. IN PRACTICE THIS MEANS, AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, THAT THE REDUCTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT OF BOTH FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS SITUATED ON THE TERRITORIES OF BELGIUM, THE GDR, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS, POLAND, THE FRG AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

4. BOTH THE TITLE AND THE CONTENTS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF FOUR SOCIALIST STATES - THE GDR, POLAND, THE USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA TABLED ON 8 NOV CONFORM IN FULL MEASURE WITH CARRYING OUT THIS TASK WHICH STANDS BEFORE US.

5. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT CARRYING OUT THIS TASK INVOLVES THE EXAMINATION OF A WHOLE SERIES OF COMPLICATED PROBLEMS. THE COMPLEXITY OR THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF ONE OR ANOTHER TYPE OF WEAPON, HOWEVER, CANNOT IN THEMSELVES IN ANY WAY SERVE AS A BASIS FOR EXCLUDING THIS FORM OF A WEAPON FROM REDUCTION AND LEAVING IT TO ONE SIDE. ON THE CONTRARY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE QUESTION BEFORE US WE CONSIDER IT EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE APPROACH TO THE DISCUSSION OF THEM AND OUR VIEWS AND PROPOSALS SHOULD HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE CHARACTER, AS IS THE CASE IN THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE FOUR SOCIALIST STATES.

6. ONE CAN SCARCELY CONSIDER COMPREHENSIVE AN APPROACH UNDER WHICH  
SECRET

PAGE 03 VIENNA 10210 112301Z

WE WOULD HAVE TO EXAMINE ONLY SOME COMPONENTS OF THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN THE AREA IN QUESTION. THE PROPOSAL OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES TO BREAK UP INTO PHASES THE TALKS THEMSELVES AND THE REDUCTION MEASURES WHICH IT IS ESSENTIAL SHOULD BE ELABORATED AND IMPLEMENTED ALSO FAILS TO CONFORM WITH SUCH AN APPROACH.

7. IN OUR VIEW, DURING THESE TALKS WE MUST CONSTANTLY KEEP IN MIND THE INCONTESTABLE AND OBJECTIVE FACT THAT THE COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF ARMED FORCES AS A WHOLE ARE DETERMINED BY THE AGGREGATE OF ALL THEIR INDIVIDUAL TYPES AND ARMAMENTS SITUATED IN THE AREA IN QUESTION. AND IF THIS IS THE CASE, ONE CAN SCARCELY RECOGNISE AS REALISTIC THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD FOR DISCUSSION BY THE

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, WHICH PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPT OF SO-CALLED DISPARITIES, WHICH IS UNFOUNDED AND UNACCEPTABLE TO US. BOTH WE AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT HERE THE GROUNDLESSNESS OF THIS CONCEPT. I WISH NOW ONLY TO REMARK THAT IT SOUNDS ALL THE MORE STRANGE WHEN HIGHLY COMPETENT AND RESPONSIBLE PEOPLE IN THE WEST, WHILE DECLARING THAT THEIR POLICY OF MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IS BASED ON PRESERVING THE BALANCE OF ARMED FORCES, AT THE SAME TIME TALK OF VARIOUS PLANS FOR CARRYING OUT A "REFORM OF THE DEFENCE STRUCTURE", WHICH IS SUPPOSED TO HEIGHTEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES.

8. AS FOR THE TASK OF THE PRESENT TALKS, ANOTHER QUESTION ARISES: HOW DO WE MEAN TO REACH THE GOAL AHEAD OF US? IT IS EVIDENT THAT A DECISION ON WHAT ARE TO BE OUR METHODS, ON WHAT ROAD WE ARE TO SET OUT, CAN BE IN THE FUTURE DECISIVE FOR SUCCESSFUL MOVEMENT FORWARD. WE CONSIDER THAT THE MOST SENSIBLE AND MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF CONDUCTING OUR TALKS WOULD BE TO CONTINUE THEM ON THE BASIS OF AN ALL-EMBRACING DRAFT AGREEMENT, AS IS PROPOSED BY THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY CORRESPOND TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS. WE HAVE ALSO

BEEN CONVINCED OF THE CORRECTNESS OF SUCH A METHOD BY THE SPEECHES OF THE HEADS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE CO-SPONSORING COUNTRIES, IN WHICH THEY THOROUGHLY ANALYZED AND DEMONSTRATED THE REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHARACTER OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT PROPOSED BY THEM. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT OF THE 4 SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALLOWS US TO BEGIN PRACTICAL NEGOTIATIONS STRAIGHT AWAY. STUDY AND ANALYSIS  
SECRET

PAGE 04 VIENNA 10210 112301Z

OF THIS DOCUMENT SHOWS THAT IT ENVISAGES MEASURES ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH ARE ENTIRELY CAPABLE OF IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFIC.

9. THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TAKES ACCOUNT OF AND EMBODIES THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED. IT CONFORMS FULLY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES. THIS IS BECAUSE THE DRAFT ENVISAGES THE REDUCTION BOTH OF FOREIGN AND NATIONAL ARMED FORCES OF THE ELEVEN STATES WHICH ARE POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS IN A FUTURE AGREEMENT ON AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE BASIS.

10. WE CONSIDER IT HIGHLY IMPORTANT THAT ALL ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTION MEASURES. PUBLIC OPINION EXPECTS THIS OF US. FOR PUBLIC OPINION IT WOULD BE INCOMPREHENSIBLE IF WE DID OTHERWISE.

11. WE ARE FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT THE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT TABLED BY THE FOUR SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WOULD FURTHER EFFECTIVE MILITARY DETENTE IN

EUROPE AND WOULD SERVE AS A CONTRIBUTION TO LASTING SECURITY  
IN THIS CONTINENT AT A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES AND  
ARMAMENTS. THIS WOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL OF US.

12. FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNILATERAL  
STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SESSION OF  
22 NOV, AND THE DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTED BY HIM ON THAT DAY, AND  
ALSO WITH THE STATEMENT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE NETHERLANDS  
AT THE SESSION OF 28 NOV CONCERNING HUNGARY, I WOULD LIKE TO  
REPEAT YET AGAIN THAT, AS WAS SET OUT IN THE COURSE OF THE  
PREPARATORY TALKS BY THE REPS OF HUNGARY AND OTHER SOCIALIST  
STATES, HUNGARY COULD CONSIDER PARTICIPATION IN POSSIBLE DECISIONS,  
AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES ONLY IF THE APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS WERE  
FULFILLED. THESE CONDITIONS ARE WELL KNOWN TO ALL PARTICIPANTS  
IN THE TALKS. THAT IS OUR UNALTERABLE POSITION.  
END TEXT. MOWNICKEL

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 10 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** SECURITY, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MEETINGS, NEGOTIATIONS, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 11 DEC 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** mcintyresh  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973VIENNA10210  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** VIENNA  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19731257/abqceloe.tel  
**Line Count:** 181  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** ACTION ACDA  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** mcintyresh  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 23 JUL 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <23-Jul-2001 by willialc>; APPROVED <13-Sep-2001 by mcintyresh>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: HUNGARIAN PLENARY STATEMENT, 11 DEC  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO BONN  
LONDON  
NATO  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR  
ANKARA

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005